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Abstract 
 
The study examines the use of governance tools to fight capital flight by reducing the capital 
flight trap. Two overarching policy syndromes are addressed in the study. It first assesses 
whether governance is an effective deterrent to the capital flight trap in Africa, before 
examining what thresholds of government quality are required to fight the capital flight trap in 
the continent. The following findings are established. Evidence of a capital flight trap is 
apparent because past values of capital flight have a positive effect on future values of capital 
flight. The net effects from interactions of the capital flight trap with political stability, 
regulation quality, economic governance and corruption-control on capital flight are positive.  
The critical masses at which “voice & accountability” and regulation quality can complement 
the capital flight trap to reduce capital flight are respectively, 0.120 and 0.680, which 
correspond to the best performing countries. Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 Two main questions are addressed by this study.  On the one hand, it assesses whether 
governance is an effective deterrent to the capital flight trap in Africa2. On the other hand, it 
examines what critical masses of government quality are required to fight the persistence of 
capital flight in the continent.  In order to tackle the overarching issues, the study is 
simultaneously concerned with avoiding the capital flight trap and capital flight. To avail 
room for more policy implications, we bundle and unbundle governance, notably: (i) political 
governance from “voice and accountability” and political stability; (ii) economic governance 
from regulation quality and government effectiveness and (iii) institutional governance from 
the rule of law and corruption-control. 
 The policy relevance of addressing the underlying questions builds on the negative 
development consequences of capital flight. Capital flight is the effect of an offshore financial 
economy that is substantially traceable to the absence of good governance (Gankou et al., 
2016; Christensen, 2011; Ndikumana, 2016; Asongu, 2017a; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017). 
There is a paradox between the increasing capital flight from Africa and the substantially 
documented need of finance for the continent’s growing ambitions. On the one hand, the 
continent is a net creditor to the rest of the world because her capital outflows substantially 
surpass corresponding capital inflows (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012a; Asongu et al., 2019). For 
instance, according to the narrative, thirty-three countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lost 
approximately 814 billion US Dollars (in constant of 2010 terms) between 1970 and 2010, to 
capital flight. The lost amount is higher than either official development assistance or foreign 
direct investment received during the same period which stood respectively at 659 and 306 
billion US Dollars.  
 On the other hand, the lack of financing is fundamental to Africa’s poverty and 
underdevelopment (Darley, 2012; Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012a; Tuomi, 2011; Bartels et al., 
2009; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a; Onifade et al., 2020a, 2020b). Accordingly, such lack of 
finance has limited socio-economic investment that is essential for the alleviation of poverty. 
                                                             
2
 The capital flight trap can be defined as persistence in capital flight whereby past capital flight positively 
affects future capital flight. The conception and definition of the capital flight trap is consistent with 
contemporary literature on persistence in macroeconomic phenomena in which  hysteresis in  macroeconomic 
phenomena is apparent when past values of macroeconomic phenomena have a positive incidence on future 
values of the corresponding macroeconomic phenomena, notably: persistence in terrorism (Asongu, 2019) and 
inequality (Tchamyou, 2020a).  In the attendant persistence literature, one lag is enough to capture past 
information. The one lag rule of thumb is consistent with the data of capital flight in this study because, the 
correlation between level and first lag series’ of capital fight is high (i.e. exceeds the rule of thumb threshold of 
0.800) while the correlation between the level and second lag series’ is not high. 
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This narrative culminates with a recent World Bank report on achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) which has revealed that extreme poverty has been decreasing in 
all regions of the world with the exception of Africa where about 45% of countries in SSA 
were substantially off-track from achieving the MDGs extreme poverty target (World Bank, 
2015; Tchamyou, 2019).   
Accordingly, in spite of the growing bulk of capital flight (Ndiaye & Siri, 2016; 
Mpenya et al., 2016) and governance (Kangoye, 2013; Musila & Sigué, 2010) literature, not 
very much is known about the connections between capital flight, the capital flight trap and 
governance. Against this backdrop, this study has a threefold contribution to existing 
literature, notably, by: (i) advancing knowledge in evolving paradigms in the conception and 
definition of governance; (ii) addressing gaps in the literature and (iii) introducing the 
modelling of the capital flight trap. The third contribution is the most important.  
First, the study complements a stream of literature on evolving paradigms in the 
definition; conception and measurement of governance (Asongu, 2016). To put this point into 
perspective, an inference is falsifiable if the term “political governance” is employed without 
the term being derived from a composite indicator that consists of both “political stability” 
and “voice & accountability”. In the same vein, it is inappropriate to use “economic 
governance” unless it is an embodiment of government effectiveness and regulation quality. 
Recent empirical examples of the employment of governance without a comprehensive 
appreciation include Kangoye (2013) who has used corruption-control and governance 
interchangeably. Accordingly, in the study under criticism, governance appears in the title 
whereas corruption-control is the main indicator. In essence, corruption-control is only an 
aspect of institutional governance. The study addresses the underlying issue by clearly 
articulating distinctions between various concepts of governance.  
Second, whereas there is a growing body of literature on capital flight in Africa, the 
relationship between governance, the capital flight trap and capital flight has not received the 
scholarly attention it deserves. Contemporary literature for the most part, has focused on 
causes and consequences of capital flight, notably, on: the nexus between  fiscal policy and 
capital flight  (Muchai & Muchai, 2016); determinants of capital flight in Ethiopia (Geda & 
Yimer, 2016) and Madagascar (Ramiandrisoa  &  Rakotomanana, 2016); capital flight and 
trade misinvoicing in Zimbabwe (Kwaramba et al., 2016); the relationship between natural 
resources and capital flight in Cameroon  (Mpenya et al., 2016); the nexus between tax 
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income and capital flight in Burkina Faso (Ndiaye & Siri, 2016) and the connection between 
capital flight and public social expenditure in Congo-Brazzaville (Moulemvo, 2016).  
Third, instead of focusing on the nexus between capital flight and governance, this 
study addresses the relationship between governance, the capital flight trap and capital flight, 
in order to assess how governance can be used as a policy tool to mitigate the role of the 
capital flight trap on capital flight. It is relevant to distinguish the capital flight trap from 
capital flight because both are policy syndromes that deserve policy and scholarly attention 
(Ndikumana & Boyce, 2011a, 2011b; Boyce &  Ndikumana, 2001, 2011). Moreover, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first study in the capital flight literature to model how policy 
variables can be employed to fight a capital flight trap. Moreover, in the post-2015 
development agenda, addressing how the sustainability of capital flight can be tackled should 
be more relevant to policy.   
It is important to briefly discuss the theoretical connections between capital flight and 
governance, in the chronology of: political governance, economic governance and 
institutional governance. First, investors are very likely to respond to political instability and 
violence by disinvesting and transferring their capital to environments that are associated with 
lower risks in investment. Therefore, direct effects can be expected from political governance 
characteristics such as political instability, democracy and accountability. Moreover, 
government executives that stifle voice and accountability are likely to be rewarded with less 
capital inflows or more capital outflows.  A political environment is an important determinant 
of capital flight because it is related to damages/losses of assets and/or changes in investment- 
related insurance premiums (Collier et al., 2004; Davies, 2008; Ndikumana et al., 2015). In 
addition, if portfolio investors lack confidence in domestic political institutions (e.g. 
competitive elections and executive accountability), it is very likely that they withdraw and/or 
divert their investments to countries that have more credible and stable political institutions.  
In summary, political environmental features influence security claims linked to foreign 
ownership as well as the performance of foreign markets (Lensink et al., 2000; Le & Zak, 
2006). Government officials are also more likely to siphon government funds and deposit in 
tax havens in the absence of political stability and “voice and accountability”.  
Second, investors can be discouraged from investing in an economy owing to an 
uncertain economic outlook, which is often the product of poor economic governance. In 
other words, investors have been documented to prefer less ambiguous investment climates 
(Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 2018). Poor governance can lead to substantial damages in the 
6 
 
economy and such economic setbacks influence investors’ perceptions about asset valuation. 
Hence, in the face of bleak macroeconomic prospects and a poor economic outlook, assets 
and money can easily be diverted from one country to another.   From the perspective of 
government officials, in an atmosphere of poor economic governance, the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities could be designed to divert 
government funds to tax havens.  
Third, on the connection between capital flight and institutional governance, we argue 
that both the rule of law and corruption-control affect the confidence that investors bestow on 
an economy and the capacity of public officials to siphon and divert funds to tax havens 
abroad. In essence, investors are less likely to put their money in an economic environment 
where disrespect of the rule of law is systemic. Such investors are also not very likely to 
engage in investing if they are reasonably convinced that economic governance can be 
weakened through predation by the State. Accordingly, respect of the rule of law guarantees: 
more property rights protection and investors that they would not be expropriated of their 
investments. Such expropriation discourages foreign investments and affects capital flight. In 
addition, countries that have corrupt executives often lack the commitment to respect the 
rights to private ownership and/or property rights. The narrative in this paragraph on the 
relationship between institutional governance and capital flight is consistent with recent 
literature on the nexus between institutional governance and industrialisation (Asongu & 
Odhiambo, 2019b), notably, that investors prefer macroeconomic environments that are 
characterised by better information accounting standards (La Porta et al., 1998), efficient 
courts (Djankov et al., 2003) and enhanced institutions with less corrupt governments (La 
Porta et al., 1999). These tendencies have been confirmed in African-focused institutional 
studies (Asongu, 2012; Fowowe, 2014; Muazu & Alagidede, 2017). 
In the light of the above, the following testable hypotheses are examined in the 
empirical section of this study, namely: (i) Hypothesis 1 (Political governance decreases the 
positive incidence of the capital flight trap on capital flight); (ii) Hypothesis 2 (Economic 
governance reduces the positive influence of the capital flight trap on capital flight) and (iii) 
Hypothesis 3 (Institutional governance decreases the positive effect of the capital flight trap 
on capital flight). The two research questions disclosed in the first paragraph of this section 
are assessed by each of the three testable hypotheses.   The rest of the study is structured as 
follows. Section 2 discusses research methods, while Section 3 presents the empirical results. 
Section 4 concludes with implications and future research directions.  
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2. Research methods 
2.1 Data, measurements and control variables  
The study examines a panel of thirty-seven African countries using data for period 1996-2010 
from three main sources, notably: (i) capital flight from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012a); (ii) 
governance variables from the World Bank Governance Indicators and (iii) macroeconomic 
economic control variables from the African Development Indicators of the World Bank.  The 
periodicity of 1996-2010 is due to constraints in data availability at the time of the study. 
Whereas 2010 is the latest year for the capital flight data, good governance indicators are only 
available from 1996.   
 The dependent variable which is capital flight shows unrecorded capital flows between 
one country and the rest of the world. The measurement of these flows starts with inflows in 
foreign exchange that are considered in a country’s balance of payments, such that, missing 
money (the difference between recorded inflows and corresponding outflows) is presented in 
terms of “net errors and omissions”. The capital flight measurement is consistent with recent 
literature (Weeks, 2015; Efobi & Asongu, 2016).  
 The main concern with the applicability of the capital flight indicator is the fact that it 
cannot be directly compared with other variables because it is disclosed in constant 2010 US 
Dollar terms. Borrowing from Asongu (2014a), the concern is addressed by:  (i) transforming 
current GDP into constant 2010 terms; (ii) dividing the corresponding value by 1 000 000 to 
obtain a GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions) and (iii) finally dividing the capital flight 
data by the GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions). Ultimately, an indicator of capital flight 
is obtained that is comparable with other variables in terms of means and standard deviations 
(see Appendix 2).  
 The governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are bundled in Section 2.1 by 
means of principal component analysis (PCA). Though unbundled, the six governance 
indicators have been used in recent governance literature (Oluwatobi et al., 2015; Andrés et 
al., 2015; Yerrabit & Hawkes, 2015; Gani, 2011; Ajide & Raheem, 2016a, 2016b).   
 In addition to the governance indicators, another independent variable of interest is the 
lagged value of capital flight that is used to assess the capital flight trap. This lagged value of 
capital flight is interacted with governance indicators in order to examine: (i) the net effect of 
governance and the capital flight trap on capital flight and (ii) thresholds of governance at 
which governance interacts with the capital flight trap to have a negative effect on capital 
flight.  
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 The study controls for the following variables in order to limit omission variable bias: 
public investment, foreign direct investment (FDI), inflation, GDP growth and trade openness. 
These control variables have been documented in a bulk of capital flight literature (Boyce & 
Ndikumana, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2008, 2011, 2012a, 2012b; Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2013, 
2015). First, the expected signs from trade and FDI on capital flight cannot be easily 
established because they are contingent on whether FDI is limited to a few economic sectors 
or broad-based. Notwithstanding, it is very likely that trade and financial globalisation are 
associated with capital flight because of among others: more avenues for accounting 
malpractices like transfer mispricing (Ndikumana & Sarr, 2016; Asongu & Amankwah-
Amoah, 2018). Second, very high inflation, for the most part, positively influences capital 
flight because it is associated with a negative economic/investment outlook as well as 
uncertainty in investment return. This intuition is consistent with documented evidence that 
investors prefer investment strategies that are less ambiguous (Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 
2018).   
Third, the incidence of economic prosperity within the perspective of economic growth can 
either be positive or negative on capital flight contingent on whether the underlying economic 
growth is limited to specific sectors of the economy (e.g. heavy resource industries) or broad-
based. On the one hand, broad-based economic growth can negatively influence capital flight 
because the investment outlook is more stable. On the other hand, economic growth that is 
skewed to select extractive industries is more likely to be positively linked to capital flight, in 
the light of the discourse on FDI and trade above. Fourth, the effect of public investment is 
contingent on its association with corruption-related activities. Accordingly, from an indirect 
angle, broad-based growth required to reduce capital flight may be less apparent when public 
investment is associated with corruption.  From a direct perspective, funds that are siphoned 
by government officials in “public investment”-related contracts are more likely to be 
concealed in tax heavens abroad. This narrative on linkages between public investment, 
corruption and conditions for economic prosperity is consistent with Baliamoune-Lutz and 
Ndikumana (2008). The definition of variables and corresponding sources are provided in 
Appendix 1, the summary statistics in disclosed in Appendix 2 while the correlation matrix is 
presented in Appendix 3.  
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2.2 Data analysis techniques 
2.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 Principal component analysis (PCA) is employed to bundle six governance indicators 
into three composite measurements, namely: economic, institutional and political 
governances. The PCA technique to bundling governance has recently been employed by 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) in the governance literature. Moreover, it is important to 
note that the PCA technique is appropriate for the sampled African countries because such a 
technique has been used in contemporary literature focusing on African samples (Tchamyou, 
2017, 2020b). The technique consists of reducing the dimensions of a set of highly correlated 
variables into an uncorrelated smaller set of such variables known as principal components 
(PCs).  The associated PCs reflect considerable information or variation from the main 
dataset.  In the light of the PCA framework, the underlying six governance indicators from 
Kaufmann et al. (2010) are reduced to: (i) political governance (which consists of “voice & 
accountability” and political stability); (ii) economic governance (entailing regulation quality 
and government effectiveness) and (iii) institutional governance (a composition of the rule of 
law and corruption-control).  The derived PC-related indicators now have distinct definitions: 
(i) political governance is the election and replacement of political leaders; (ii) economic 
governance is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public commodities 
while (iii) institutional governance is the respect of the State and citizens of institutions that 
govern interactions between them.  
 The criterion used to select the PCs is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). They 
have recommended that common factors to be retained should have eigenvalues of above one. 
As shown in Table 1 below: (i) political governance (Polgov) which summarises about 
83.50% of information from political stability and ‘voice & accountability’ has an eigenvalue 
of 1.671; (ii) economic governance (Ecogov) that represents approximately 93.90% of 
information from regulation quality and government effectiveness has an eigenvalue of 1.878 
while (iii) institutional governance (Instgov) that denotes about 93.00% of information from 
the rule of law and corruption-control has an eigenvalue of 1.861.  
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Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Composite Governance  
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness.  PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
 We now devote space to engaging some important concerns that could arise from the 
use of regressors that are obtained from baseline regressions. Such issues are related to the 
efficiency, consistency and inferential validity of estimated coefficients (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2016a). Consistent with Pagan (1984, p.242), while estimates from two-step 
processes are efficient and consistent, corresponding inferences may not be valid. This 
caution on inferential validity is broadly in line with the bulk of empirical literature on the 
subject, notably: Oxley and McAleer (1993); McKenzie and McAleer (1997); Ba and Ng 
(2006) and Westerlund and Urbain (2013a).   
 Concerns surrounding the inferential quality of PCA-augmented variables have been 
documented by Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b). The authors have built on a strand of 
literature on such concerns (Pesaran, 2006; Stock & Watson, 2002; Bai, 2003; Bai, 2009; 
Greenaway-McGrevy et al., 2012) to establish that normal inferences can be made with PC-
augmented regressors, so long as the corresponding estimated parameters converge to their 
real values at the rate of NT , (with T being the number of time series and N denoting cross-
section observations). The authors have further articulated that for the underlying 
convergence to occur, T and N have to be sufficiently large. Unfortunately, the authors do not 
emphasis “how large should be large” for such convergence to take place. Concerning the 
specific context of this inquiry, two major concerns are worth articulating. On the one hand, it 
is difficult to stretch T because capital flight data is up to the year 2010 while the governance 
indicators start from the year 1996. On the other hand, it is also unfeasible to stretch N 
because we have already engaged the 37 African countries in the capital flight database. In a 
nutshell, we argue that valid inferences are feasible because recent literature on PC-
augmented regressors has used substantially lower values of T and N to established valid 
governance-related inferences (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a).  
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2.2.2 Estimation technique  
 The selection of the estimation technique builds on contemporary literature on the 
importance of adopting an estimation technique that is consistent with the behavior of data (Li 
et al., 2014, 2016; Kou et al., 2012, 2014, 2016, 2019a, 2019b; Asongu, 2017b; Asongu & 
Biekpe, 2017; Zhang et al., 2019). Hence, the choice of the estimation technique builds on 
five principal factors: while the first-two are basic requirements, the last-three are associated 
advantages (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017; Tchamyou et al., 2018). First, the technique enables 
the approach to control for a capital flight trap since the criterion for persistence in capital 
flight is met. Accordingly, the correlation between capital flight and the corresponding first 
lag is 0.867 which is higher than the 0.800 threshold needed to ascertain persistence in a 
dependent variable (Tchamyou, 2019, 2020b). Second, the N>T (or 37>5) criterion that is 
required for the GMM strategy is fulfilled because the number of cross sections is higher than 
the number of time series in each cross section. Third, the estimation strategy accounts for 
potential endogeneity in all regressors by controlling for time invariant omitted variables on 
the one hand and simultaneity with instrumented regressors on the other hand. Fourth, cross-
country differences are considered in the regressions. Fifth, biases that are associated with the 
difference GMM strategy are tackled with the system GMM strategy.  
 In this study, the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) GMM approach is used. It is an extension 
of Arellano and Bover (1995) and employs forward orthogonal deviations as opposed to first 
differences. This extension has been documented to limit over-identification and restrict 
instrument proliferation (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008; Tchamyou et al., 2019a). In 
the specification, a two-step procedure is adopted in place of a one-step process because it 
accounts for heteroscedasticity. The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) 
summarize the standard system GMM estimation procedure, where the independent variables 
of interest are specified to be one lag less contemporary.  
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where, tiCap ,
 
is capital flight of country i
 
in  period t ; 1, tiCap
 
is capital flight of country i
 
in  period 1t ; 1, tiGov
 
is governance (political, economic or institutional) of country i
 
in 
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period 1t ; 0  is a constant;
 
 represents the coefficient of auto-regression which is one 
because a lag of one year is enough to capture past information; W  is the vector of control 
variables  (Trade, Growth, Inflation, FDI and Public Investment),
 
i
 
is the country-specific 
effect, t
 
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. 
 
2.2.3 Identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions  
 Discussing concerns surrounding identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions 
is paramount in the specification of GMM. As documented in recent literature (Dewan & 
Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; Tchamyou et al., 2019b), all independent 
indicators are considered as predetermined or suspected endogenous while time-invariant 
omitted variables are considered as strictly exogenous. In essence, it is unfeasible for time-
invariant omitted indicators to become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b). 
Therefore, the approach for treating ivstyle (time invariant omitted variables) is ‘iv(years, 
eq(diff))’ whereas   the gmmstyle is used  for suspected endogenous  variables.  
 The issue of simultaneity is tackled with lagged regressors used as instruments for 
forward differenced indicators. Accordingly, Helmert transformations are used to eliminate 
fixed effects that are likely to be correlated with the error terms and bias estimated linkages 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995; Love & Zicchino, 2006).  These transformations consist of using 
forward mean-variations of variables  which is contrary to the procedure of deducting 
previous observations from present ones (Roodman, 2009b, p.104). In essence, the mean of 
future observations is subtracted from the previous indicators. This transformation provides 
parallel or orthogonal conditions between the forward-differenced variables and lagged 
values. Regardless of the number of lags, the loss of data is avoided by computing the 
suggested transformations for all observations with the exception of each cross section’s last 
observation: “And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as 
instruments” (Roodman (2009b, p. 104). 
 In the light of the above, capital flight is affected by the time invariant omitted 
variables exclusively through predetermined or suspected endogenous variables. In addition, 
the statistical solidity of the exclusion restriction is examined with the Difference in Hansen 
Test (DHT) for the validity of instruments. Accordingly, in order for time invariant indicators 
to elucidate capital flight exclusively via the endogenous explaining variables, the alternative 
hypothesis of the test should be rejected. It is interesting to note that whereas with an 
instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique, failing to accept the alternative hypothesis of 
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the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that the instruments elicit 
the outcome variable exclusively via the suspected endogenous variables (Beck et al., 2003; 
Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016c), with the current GMM technique, the information criterion 
used to investigate if time invariant omitted variables are strictly exogenous is the DHT. 
Hence, based on these clarifications, the hypothesis of exclusive restriction is confirmed if the 
null hypothesis of the DHT linked with IV(year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. 
  
3. Empirical results  
Table 2 (examining Hypothesis 1), Table 3 (assessing Hypothesis 2) and Table 4 
(investigating Hypothesis 3) respectively present findings related to political governance, 
economic governance and institutional governance. Four principal information criteria are 
employed to examine the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal deviations3. 
Consistent with the two main questions motivating the study, we compute: (i) the net effect of 
governance and the capital flight trap on capital flight and (ii) thresholds of governance at 
which governance interacts with the capital flight trap to have a negative effect on capital 
flight. For instance in the last column of Table 3, the unconditional and conditional effects of 
capital flight trap are respectively: 0.483 and -0.120. The corresponding economic governance 
threshold at which the unconditional positive effect of the capital flight trap on capital flight is 
reduced by economic governance is   4.025 (0.483/0.120) whereas the net effect is 0.462 
(0.483 + [-0.120×0.172])4. Unfortunately, the threshold or critical mass of 4.025 does not 
make economic sense because it is not within the range (-3.284 to 3.276) provided by the 
summary statistics.  
 The following findings can be established from Table 2. Evidence of a capital flight 
trap is apparent because past values of capital flight have a positive effect on future values of 
capital flight. The net effect from the role of political stability in the capital flight trap is 
positive. The threshold at which “voice & accountability” can complement the capital flight 
trap to reduce capital flight is 0.120. This threshold has economic significance because it is 
                                                             
3
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen 
overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the 
positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test 
is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order 
to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower 
than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a 
Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
4
 0.172 is the mean value of Economic Governance.  
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within the “voice & accountability” range (-1.885 to 0.932) disclosed in the summary 
statistics.  Most of the significant control variables have expected signs. 
The following findings can be established from Table 3 on the linkages between 
capital flight, the capital flight trap and economic governance. There is evidence of a capital 
flight trap because past values of capital flight have a positive effect on future values of 
capital flight. The net effects from the roles of regulation quality and economic governance 
are positive. The threshold at which regulation  quality can complement the capital flight trap 
to reduce capital flight is 0.680, just close of the maximum disclosed by the range (-2.412 to 
0.791) of the summary statistics. The thresholds at which economic governance can 
complement the capital flight trap to reduce capital flight do not make economic sense 
because they are not within the ranges provided by the summary statistics.  Most of the 
significant control variables have expected signs.  
The following findings can be established from Table 4 on the linkages between 
capital flight, the capital flight trap and institutional governance. There is evidence of a capital 
flight trap because past values of capital flight have a positive effect on future values of 
capital flight. The net effect from the role of corruption-control is positive. Most of the 
significant control variables have expected signs. 
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Table 2: Capital flight trap and political governance (Hypothesis 1) 
       
 Dependent variable: Capital Flight   
 Political Stability Voice and Accountability Political Governance 
       
Constant  5.866*** 8.136*** 9.783*** 8.908*** 8.492*** 6.590*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) 0.390*** 0.213 0.018 0.106 0.162*** 0.386*** 
 (0.002) (0.234) (0.861) (0.566) (0.003) (0.006) 
Political Stability(-1)   -1.174* 0.631 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.071) (0.523)     
Voice & Accountability(-1)  --- --- 1.359** 1.332 --- --- 
   (0.047) (0.166)   
Political Governance(-1)  --- --- --- --- 0.436 0.487 
     (0.202) (0.370) 
Political Stability(-1) × CF(-1)   0.113* -0.075 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.090) (0.461)     
Voice & Accountability(-1) × CF(-1) --- --- -0.150** -0.126 --- --- 
   (0.034) (0.214)   
Political Governance(-1) × CF(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.044 -0.047 
     (0.229) (0.414) 
Trade Openness 0.001** 0.0008 0.002*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002 
 (0.044) (0.648) (0.001) (0.242) (0.003) (0.130) 
GDP growth -0.005** -0.006 -0.004* -0.003 -0.004* -0.007 
 (0.047) (0.267) (0.058) (0.595) (0.063) (0.234) 
Inflation  0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Foreign Direct Investment --- -0.007 --- -0.013*** --- -0.012** 
  (0.190)  (0.001)  (0.017) 
Public Investment --- -0.010 --- -0.021*** --- -0.015* 
  (0.200)  (0.002)  (0.064) 
Net effects  0.318 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
Thresholds  n.s.a n.a 0.120 n.a n.a n.a 
       
AR(1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.249) (0.284) (0.556) (0.390) (0.380) (0.091) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.347) (0.998) (0.539) (0.992) (0.316) (0.999) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.572) (0.781) (0.559) (0.598) (0.553) (0.769) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.246) (0.999) (0.454) (0.998) (0.224) (0.999) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.154) (0.665) (0.353) (0.608) (0.211) (0.868) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.604) (1.000) (0.615) (1.000) (0.463) (1.000) 
       
Fisher  223.21*** 1756.34*** 8026.11*** 1065.96*** 2686.48*** 865.04*** 
Countries  33 32 33 32 33 32 
Observations  302 265 302 265 302 265 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance 
of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR test. na: not applicable due to the 
insignificance of conditional effects. 
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Table 3: Capital flight trap and economic governance (Hypothesis 2) 
       
 Dependent variable: Capital Flight   
 Regulation Quality  Government Effectiveness  Economic Governance 
       
Constant  8.835*** 7.213*** 10.053*** 6.768*** 5.898*** 5.368*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) 0.102 0.303** 0.007 0.357** 0.397*** 0.483*** 
 (0.361) (0.026) (0.958) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regulation Quality(-1)      1.609* 1.367* --- --- --- --- 
 (0.070) (0.096)     
Government Effectiveness (-1)  --- --- 2.418* 0.941 --- --- 
   (0.092) (0.519)   
Economic  Governance (-1)  --- --- --- --- 0.933* 1.297** 
     (0.045) (0.023) 
Regulation Quality × CF(-1)   -0.150* -0.124 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.097) (0.151)     
Government Effectiveness(-1) × CF(-1) --- --- -0.234 -0.079 --- --- 
   (0.114) (0.594)   
Economic Governance(-1) × CF(-1) --- --- --- --- -0.083* -0.120** 
     (0.073) (0.041) 
Trade Openness 0.0008 0.001 0.002*** 0.001 -0.0002 0.00009 
 (0.195) (0.398) (0.002) (0.123) (0.739) (0.948) 
GDP growth 0.004* 0.001 -0.0003 -0.003 0.0009 -0.006 
 (0.090) (0.794) (0.859) (0.575) (0.652) (0.327) 
Inflation  0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003**** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment --- -0.004 --- -0.006 --- -0.003 
  (0.338)  (0.183)  (0.479) 
Public Investment --- -0.006 --- -0.016** --- 0.001 
  (0.500)  (0.015)  (0.865) 
       
Net effects  0.196 n.a n.a n.a  0.382 0.462 
Thresholds  0.680 n.a n.a n.a  4.783 4.025 
       
AR(1) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.300) (0.151) (0.396) (0.485) (0.156) (0.542) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.422) (0.907) (0.473) (0.997) (0.428) (0.968) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.635) (0.589) (0.438) (0.873) (0.716) (0.739) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.292) (0.913) (0.452) (0.993) (0.264) (0.956) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.115) (0.153) (0.243) (0.439) (0.398) (0.584) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.798) (1.000) (0.650) (1.000) (0.428) (1.000) 
       
Fisher  9607.90*** 1822.99*** 2917.87*** 1109.39*** 3304.13*** 1650.51*** 
Countries  33 32 33 32 33 32 
Observations  302 265 301 264 301 264 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance 
of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR test. na: not applicable due to the 
insignificance of conditional effects. 
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Table 4: Capital flight trap and institutional governance (Hypothesis 3) 
       
 Dependent variable: Capital Flight   
 Rule of Law Corruption Control  Institutional Governance 
       
Constant  9.713*** 8.167*** 5.291*** 4.897*** 7.338*** 5.618*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital Flight(CF) (-1) 0.036 0.185 0.460*** 0.529*** 0.270*** 0.453*** 
 (0.797) (0.199) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rule of Law(-1)    0.911 0.884 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.353) (0.338)     
Corruption Control(-1)    --- --- -2.602* -0.424 --- --- 
   (0.072) (0.762)   
Institutional  Governance (-1) --- --- --- --- -0.007 0.416 
     (0.979) (0.457) 
Rule of Law(-1) × CF(-1)   -0.095 -0.076 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.46) (0.402) 
 
   
Corruption Control(-1) × CF(-1) --- --- 0.247* 0.040 --- --- 
   (0.087) (0.766)   
Institutional  Governance(-1)× CF(-1) --- --- --- --- 0.0003 -0.037 
     (0.991) (0.516) 
Trade Openness 0.002*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.082) (0.002) (0.495) (0.004) (0.049) 
GDP growth -0.005* -0.001 -0.004 0.0001 -0.007** -0.003 
 (0.059) (0.789) (0.167) (0.973) (0.029) (0.345) 
Inflation  0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Foreign Direct Investment --- -0.013*** --- -0.001 --- -0.006 
  (0.000)  (0.756)  (0.110) 
Public Investment --- -0.019*** --- -0.011 --- -0.008 
  (0.002)  (0.156)  (0.279) 
       
Net effects  n.a n.a 0.288 n.a n.a n.a 
Thresholds n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
       
AR(1) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022) 
AR(2) (0.558) (0.270) (0.109) (0.105) (0.268) (0.320) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.934) (0.996) (0.491) (0.962) (0.624) (0.944) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.690) (0.878) (0.516) (0.813) (0.523) (0.550) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.910) (0.990) (0.425) (0.922) (0.578) (0.966) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.449) (0.525) (0.609) (0.344) (0.495) (0.688) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.988) (1.000) (0.361) (1.000) (0.602) (0.970) 
       
Fisher  3058.09*** 1430.96*** 4386.61*** 527.25*** 9194.55*** 218.34*** 
Countries  33 32 33 32 33 32 
Observations  302 265 301 264 301 264 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ 
Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance 
of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) 
and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR test. na: not applicable due to the 
insignificance of conditional effects. 
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It is relevant to clarify that while net effects and corresponding thresholds could not be 
computed for most of the estimations in Tables 2-4 because at least one estimated coefficient 
essential for such computation is not significant; the study argues that both statistically 
significant and statistically insignificant estimates have economic meaning. In the light of the 
arguments from the literature used to substantiate the testable hypotheses in the introduction, 
it was expected that the governance dynamics would modulate the capital flight trap to induce 
net negative effects on capital flight. However, the findings are disclosed in order to avoid 
publication bias in social science scholarship where authors prefer to submit only strong, 
expected and significant findings for publication because of the peer review culture of 
rejecting manuscripts with weak, unexpected and insignificant results (Rosenberg, 2005; 
Franco et al., 2014; Boateng et al., 2018). It what follows, the economic significance of the 
unexpected findings is clarified in the light of the time and level assumptions underpinning 
the benefits of governance in development outcomes.  
 In the light of the above, governance standards should be increased in order for 
sampled countries to gain from the time and level assumptions for the rewards of governance 
in moderating the capital flight trap to induce negative net effects on capital flight. It is 
important to note that, the favourable impacts of governance in development outcomes have 
been tested independently to establish a non-linear relationship between democracy-driven 
governance standards and development outcomes in developing nations (Sung, 2004; Asongu, 
2014b). First, on the premise of the level assumption, the attendant literature (Sung, 2004; 
Back & Hadenius, 2008; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016d) has established that countries with 
strong democracies enjoy the highest standards of governance; countries with partially-
democratic standards are associated with the least standard of governance while authoritarian 
countries enjoy average governance levels. Second, with respect to the time of exposure 
assumption, authoritarian regimes are associated with better governance standards compared 
to young democracies while strong democracies enjoy the highest standards of governance 
(Keefer, 2007). It follows that because democracies in sampled countries are both weak (level 
assumption) and young (time of exposure assumption), the corresponding governance 
standards are not yet very strong. This explanation is consistent with the negative skewness 
that characterizes the governance dynamics disclosed in the summary statistics. Accordingly, 
the negative skeweness is assessed from the fact that: (i) mean values of the governance 
dynamics are negative and corresponding minimum values are greater in magnitude compared 
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to the attendant maximum values. How governments in sampled countries can improve 
governance standards is discussed in the concluding section. 
 
4. Concluding implications and further research directions 
 
Two overarching policy syndromes have been addressed in this inquiry. It has first 
assessed whether governance is an effective deterrent to the capital flight trap in Africa, 
before examining what thresholds of government quality are required to fight the capital flight 
trap in the continent. For these purposes, using principal component analysis and interactive 
Generalised Method of Moments, we have bundled and unbundled nine governance indicators 
in 37 African countries for the period 1996-2010.  
The bundled governance variables are:  (i) political governance (encompassing 
political stability and “voice & accountability”); (ii) economic governance (represented by 
government effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) institutional governance (entailing 
the rule of law and corruption-control). To provide responses to the two main questions, three 
hypotheses are tested, namely: (i) Hypothesis 1 (Political governance decreases the positive 
incidence of the capital flight trap on capital flight); (ii) Hypothesis 2 (Economic governance 
reduces the positive influence of the capital flight trap on capital flight) and (iii) Hypothesis 3 
(Institutional governance decreases the positive effect of the capital flight trap on capital 
flight).  
 The following findings have been established on linkages between capital flight, 
capital flight trap and governance. Evidence of a capital flight trap is apparent because past 
values of capital flight have a positive effect on future values of capital flight. The net effects 
from interactions of the capital flight trap with political stability, regulation quality, economic 
governance and corruption-control on capital flight are positive. The critical masses at which 
“voice & accountability” and regulation quality can complement the capital flight trap to 
reduce capital flight are respectively 0.120 and 0.680, which correspond to best performing 
countries.  
 There are two direct implications from the study.  On the one hand, the positive net 
effects imply that the current governance climate in Africa is not enough to fight the capital 
flight trap. Hence, improvements in political governance, economic governance and 
institutional governance are imperative to significantly reduce capital flight. On the other 
hand, the fact that thresholds or critical masses of regulation quality and “voce & 
accountability” are close to the maximum range of the summary statistics imply that only a 
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few best performing countries at the moment can successfully use governance tools to fight 
capital flight by reducing the capital flight trap. This point is consistent with the preceding 
inference that much needs to be done in terms of improving governance standards in view of 
mitigating capital flight.  
 Consistent with Asongu and Odhiambo (2020), the improvement of governance 
standards for favorable macroeconomic outcomes is largely traceable to the fact that the 
governance standards from World Development Indicators of the World Bank used in this 
study have both positive and negative values. Moreover, as we have established in the 
previous section, the governance dynamics used in this study are negatively skewed. In what 
follows, measures that can be implemented to improve political, economic and institutional 
dimensions of governance are discussed.  
 First, political governance can be improved by enhancing conditions for the election 
and replacement of political leaders. Measures to enhance political governance include, inter 
alia: (i) mitigation of incidences that can positively influence the ability of governments in the 
sampled nations to be overthrown via unconstitutional and violent channels which often 
involve political strife and terrorism. (ii) Improvement of the ability of citizens to be actively 
involved in the selection of government officials as well as the right of citizens to enjoy 
freedoms of expression, association and access to media.  
Second, on the front of economic governance, substantial ameliorations are 
worthwhile in the formulation and implementation of measures that deliver public 
commodities especially in the light of enhancing the environment of doing business and 
attracting foreign investment. Accordingly, economic governance measures should be tailored 
to avoid negative perceptions by investors on the valuation of assets. This is essentially 
because a gloomy macroeconomic outlook motivates investors to divert their assets and 
capital to other countries. To further improve economic governance, governments of sampled 
countries need to be credible to retain investors as well as boost investors’ confidence, 
promote private sector development and competition, limit political pressure that negatively 
affects the macroeconomic outlook and provide quality regulation.  
Third, in relation to institutional governance, for investors (i.e. domestic and foreign) 
to retain capital in the sampled countries, such investors need to have confidence in domestic 
institutions in the short, medium and long terms.  Such confidence starts when both the 
government and citizens respect prevailing institutions that govern interactions between them, 
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especially as it pertains to upholding the rule of law,  fighting corruption, protecting property 
rights and upholding better information accounting standards, inter alia.  
 The empirical contribution of this study is that to the best of our knowledge, we have 
focused on fighting capital flight through the capital flight trap, by modeling capital flight trap 
with interactive GMM. Future research can improve the existing literature by employing the 
technique in modeling the persistence of other macroeconomic variables with negative 
signals. Moreover, assessing whether the established linkages in the study withstand further 
empirical scrutiny when conditional distributions of governance variables are considered is 
also worthwhile. This recommendation is motivated by the fact that the established net effects 
are based on mean values of governance. In the light of the recommendation, above and 
below median levels of governance could provide other policy relevant insights.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of  Variables (Measurements) Sources 
    
Capital Flight  Ln of Capital Flight (constant of 2010)  Ndikumana & 
Boyce (2012a) 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political Governance  Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  Quality  RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
Trade Openness   Trade  Export plus Imports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign investment  FDI Foreign Direct Investment inflows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment Pub.I Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
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Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1996-2010) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Capital flight (log) 9.993 0.806 6.816 12.333 464 
Political Stability -0.637 0.943 -2.986 1.188 444 
Voice & Accountability  -0.668 0.667 -1.885 0.932 444 
Political Governance  -0.052 1.257 -2.974 2.709 444 
Government Effectiveness  -0.640 0.578 -1.974 0.876 443 
Regulation Quality  -0.631 0.562 -2.412 0.791 444 
Economic Governance  0.172 1.216 -3.284 3.276 443 
Rule of Law -0.694 0.613 -2.207 0.773 444 
Control of Corruption  -0.571 0.579 -2.057 1.249 443 
Institutional Governance 0.049 1.313 -3.139 3.676 443 
Trade Openness   75.890 39.816 17.858 255.015 525 
GDP growth   4.435 4.661 -17.254 33.629 540 
Inflation  74.917 1099.538 -100.00 24411.03 508 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows  3.994 5.935 -8.629 40.157 405 
Public Investment   7.217 4.143 0.000 25.007 477 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (Uniform sample size: 248) 
                
Political governance Economic governance Institutional governance Control variables Capital  
PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov Trade GDPg Infl. FDI Pub.I Flight  
1.000 0.734 0.930 0.658 0.642 0.672 0.718 0.773 0.773 0.320 -0.001 -0.218 0.106 0.352 -0.196 PS 
 1.000 0.932 0.761 0.739 0.775 0.738 0.773 0.783 0.067 -0.018 -0.153 0.049 0.215 -0.024 VA 
  1.000 0.762 0.742 0.777 0.782 0.830 0.836 0.207 -0.010 -0.199 0.083 0.304 -0.118 Polgov 
   1.000 0.873 0.969 0.858 0.879 0.901 0.006 0.004 -0.215 -0.051 0.247 0.184 GE 
    1.000 0.965 0.747 0.818 0.811 -0.018 -0.105 -0.297 -0.127 0.099 0.167 RQ 
     1.000 0.831 0.878 0.886 -0.005 -0.050 -0.263 -0.091 0.181 0.181 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.855 0.966 0.153 -0.049 -0.215 0.008 0.296 -0.040 CC 
       1.000 0.959 0.110 -0.016 -0.236 0.052 0.341 0.027 RL 
        1.000 0.138 -0.034 -0.234 0.030 0.329 -0.008 Instgov 
         1.000 -0.051 0.127 0.358 0.299 -0.253 Trade 
          1.000 0.037 0.039 0.155 0.085 GDPg 
           1.000 0.185 -0.003 0.209 Infl. 
            1.000 0.202 -0.169 FDI 
             1.000 -0.257 Pub. I 
              1.000 Cap. Flight  
                
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control.RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. Trade: 
Trade Openness. GDPg: GDP growth. Infl: Inflation. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment inflows. Pub.I: Public Investment. Cap. Flight: Capital 
Flight.  
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